From a corporate governance point of view, this paper addresses the question about how board gender diversity influences managerial opportunistic behavior for solving agency conflicts from a sample of European countries. Specifically, we analyzed indexed nonfinancial companies from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom for the period 2006 -2016. Several panel data techniques are used in the empirical analysis to deal with the endogeneity and heterogeneity problems. To the best of our knowledge our research is novel in the literature by providing a multi-country approach in board gender diversity, as well as considering contextual, country variables and the role of the regulatory system as determinants of earnings management. Our results confirm the benefits of having a balanced board, in terms of gender diversity. An equilibrated board tends to mitigate earnings management practices, reinforcing the value of the laws passed in the last decades in Europe. Our analysis reveals that the regulatory framework regarding board gender diversity established by each country has a determinant role in reaching equality in decision-making positions, as a founding value of the European Union. We provide several policy recommendations from our main findings. The proposed directive is supported by the European Parliament and by most member states and continues to be discussed in the Council of the European Union.
The proposed directive is supported by the European Parliament and by most member states and continues to be discussed in the Council of the European Union. 3 As a matter of fact, at the European Union level, the share of women on the boards of large publicly listed companies has risen from 11.9 % in October 2010 to 23.9 % in October 2016. 4 Equal participation of women and men in decision-making positions is a matter of justice, respect for fundamental rights and good governance. 5 However, there is a widely held concern about the board's inability to ensure that management acts in the interest of stakeholders (H.-H. Huang, Chan, Chang, & Wong, 2012) . This can be observed in the not so small amount of real-life corporate scandals in which managers did not make decisions in the best interest of stakeholders, with the subsequent negative consequences on the image and reputation of companies. Hence, the role of the board of directors as a monitoring body of managers is critical in preventing managerial opportunistic behavior. Examples of corporate scandals across Europe include, among many others, Afinsa, Banesto, Gescartera The most common way to misreport the real financial information is by using earnings manipulation. To constrain such opportunistic behavior, country-level initiatives has been Finland and the UK have enacted regulation towards mandating/promoting more female representation in publicly held firms (Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016) . Norway is counted as the first European country to introduce legislation on gender quotas on the board of directors, including sanctions when not fulfilling the required quotas. Italy, Germany, France and more recently Portugal have followed the example of Norway in this regard.
This paper contributes to the current literature from different angles. First, to the best of our knowledge, ours is a ground-breaking research in studying the impact of board gender diversity on earnings management for a multi-country sample of European firms. Second, we are also novel in the literature by considering contextual, country variables in the empirical analysis to shed additional light on the role played by the regulatory system and the earnings management practices. Third, to test the robustness of our findings, we apply several gender diversity measures not yet widely used in the literature. Fourth, we follow a methodological strategy based on the application of several alternative panel data methodologies. These econometric methods allowed us to control for the unobservable heterogeneity problem and the simultaneity or endogeneity problem.
We found evidence that more female presence on the board of directors leads to less earnings manipulations practices in European countries, therefore reducing agency conflicts. These findings are in line with the existing literature. Additionally, we observe that the existence of laws mandating female quotas for more gender equilibrated boards have a positive effect in constraining the managerial opportunistic behavior. All these results reveal the timeliness of laws and recommendations regarding board gender diversity in the countries analyzed.
The paper proceeds as follows. In addition to this introductory section, the next section summarizes the literature review and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodological strategy used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and finally, in section 5, we underline the major conclusions.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

a. Earnings management and board gender diversity
Research related to economics and psychology in general find that women are more risk averse and more cautious than men in their financial decisions (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, & Schlarbaum, 1975; Estes & Hosseini, 1988; Riley Jr. & Chow K., 1992) . Barua, Davidson, Rama, and Thiruvadi (2010) and Sexton and BowmanUpton (1990) examined corporate financial and investment decisions made by female executives compared with male executives and found evidence that men exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corporate decision making compared with women. Similarly, Francis, Hasan, Park, and Wu (2015) studied the positive impact of CFO gender diversity on financial reporting in the context of accounting conservatism.
Empirical evidence also shows that women have more ethical conducts than men at corporate level in their perception of ethical business dilemmas (Bernardi, 1994; Bernardi & Arnold, 1997; Betz, O'Connell, & Shepard, 1989; Fallan, 1999; Ruegger & King, 1992) . In general, literature shows that there are not discrepancies in the literature. These gender theories support the intuition that more women in companies' board of directors improves the quality of reported earnings and the reduction of earnings management.
Previous research on the relationship between board gender diversity and the capacity of managers to manipulate earnings highlights the relevance of women's role in reducing agency conflicts and acting actively as efficient monitors. For instance, Barua et al. (2010) examined the association between the gender of chief financial officer and the quality of accruals. They concluded that companies with female CFOs have lower performancematched absolute discretionary accruals and lower absolute accrual estimation errors, confirming in this way the constraints imposed by female monitoring role on managerial opportunistic behavior. In a more contextualized case, as was in the UK, Arun, Almahrog, and Ali Aribi (2015) showed that firms with a higher number of women as independent directors are more prone to adopt restrained earnings management practices. Similarly, from a sample of firms from Fortune 500 index, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) find that earnings quality is positively associated with gender diversity in senior management; and in the same vein, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) find that greater female participation on their boards exhibited higher earnings quality for a sample of US firms. Additionally, Gavious, Segev, and Yosef (2012) found evidence of a negative relation between the presence of female directors and earnings management. They conclude that the gender of directors has value implications for analysts and investors, suggesting that there is a positive relation between the proportion of female directors and the firm value. These results are supported by the fact that the unique characteristics of women in business ethics and risk aversion, as discussed earlier, and findings regarding women's motivation and achievement, moral values, social stereotypes and the relation between task performance and self-confidence (Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2011) .
Concerning the participation of female board member on specific board committees, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) , using a sample of S&P Small Cap 600, found consistent evidence that the presence of a female director on the audit committee constrains accrualbased earnings management. Female directors are found to have a significant influence on the quality of financial reporting and contribute to the efficacy of corporate governance considerably. Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, and Olcina-Sempere (2016) found that the percentage of female directors on different committees increase the likelihood of further transparency by disclosing audit reports with less uncertainties and scope limitation qualifications. In summary, more diverse board of directors contribute to board effectiveness (Huse & Solberg, 2006) , enhanced strategic controls (Nielsen & Huse, 2010) and corporate social responsibility (Adams & Ferreira, 2009b) , and improvements of earnings forecast (Chapple, Dunstan, & Truong, 2018 Governance valid for listed private and public limited-liability companies, includes a rule that an equal distribution among the genders shall be the goal ( Numhauser-Henning, 2015) .
The policies and legislation implemented in Denmark aim to ensure flexibility for the companies by not making binding obligations (fixed targets for example), and instead prioritize the principle of self-management by leaving it up to the companies to set their own goals. The new legal framework entered into force on 1 April 2013.
The Good Governance Code of listed companies (CNMV, 2015) in Spain establishes among its principles that director selection policy should seek a balance of knowledge, experience and gender in the board's membership. Among its recommendations is the one that dictates that the director selection policy should pursue the goal of having at least 30% of total board places occupied by women directors before the year 2020. Although the 3/2007 Equality law gave Spanish public companies and listed firms eight years, until 2015, to achieve a representation in their boards of a minimum of 40% and a maximum of 60% of each gender, the absence of sanctions for noncompliant companies weakened the effectiveness of the statutory policy (Lombardo, 2015) .
In Germany's case, the Berlin Declaration of 2011 required a binding legal regulation of 30% women on advisory boards of listed, co-determined and public companies (Botsch, 2015 Thomsen (2017) demonstrate that the degree of legal coercion behind the institutional pressure for female directorship is positively associated with the share of women on the board of directors of firms in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. They suggest that before the absence of quota laws, as the organizational adaptation to societal expectations for more female directors, it should be supplemented by additional policies to ensure the transparency of board changes.
Hence, it is expected that the legislation and its enforcement concerning companies' board gender diversity is aimed at having more efficient and shareholder-focused boards. Thus, performance enhanced boards through the statutory gender diversity would commit in better monitoring that constraints the management of accounting earnings. For instance, Arun et al. (2015) and Gavious et al. (2012) provide evidence that statutory diversity plays an active role in ensuring the quality of reported earnings. In this research, we use a female board member quota as statutory measure of gender diversity, suggesting the following hypothesis:
H2: It is expected less earnings manipulation in countries with quota systems.
Methodology Design
a. Sample
The goal The econometric strategy is based upon panel data estimations. When using panel data regressions, we face the econometric limitations of unobservable heterogeneity problem (Gormley & Matsa, 2014) and the simultaneity or endogeneity problem (Baltagi, 2013; Roberts & Whited, 2013; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012) . The first problem refers to the specific, time-invariant characteristics of each firm (e.g. firm culture, business strategy, internal policies etc.); whilst the endogeneity problem arises because of the imprecision of the direction of the causality between some independent variables and the dependent variable.
For instance, the corporate governance features of board diversity impact on the earnings management, but at the same time, earnings manipulation may also impact on the board gender diversity. Therefore, since in this study both gender diversity and the other board features are endogenously determined (Gull, Nekhili, Nagati, & Chtioui, 2017) , we use a carefully formulated methodology to deal with firm-level differences and endogeneity issues.
The first regression method corresponds to the panel data with fixed effect (FE) specifications to tackle the unobservable heterogeneity problem. Hausman (1978) 's contrast allows us to compare the fixed and the random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model specifications. As exhibited in all the regressions in Table 5 , the Hausman test rejects random effects and allows us to accept the existence of time-invariant effects. In addition to the Hauman test, Breush-Pagan contrast is used to check whether the estimated variance of the residuals is dependent on the values of the independent variables (e.g. heteroskedasticity). As a preliminary estimation we found that Breush-Pagan test rejected the absence of firm specific effect, which means that the ordinary least squared (OLS) estimations are inconsistent, and consequently, FE estimations are more suitable. As a post estimation of the FE, we followed Greene (2003) and calculated a modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of each fixed effect 8
As one might expect, such average is substantially higher if adjusted by excluding from the calculation the financial companies that are part of the market indexes.
regression. Additionally, the uncentered variance inflation factor test (VIF) is used to determine the inexistence of autocorrelation problems in the estimations. As observed in the regressions reported in all tables, the values of VIF do not exceed 2.5 which are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity.
Given that in a minor number of estimations, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticitydistributed as a Chi-squared-was rejected in the fixed effect estimations, we proceeded with the Feasible Generalized Least Squared estimations (F-GLS) and the panel-corrected standard error (PCSE).
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These strategies allow estimation in the presence of first-order autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels.
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Finally, the panel-data GMM Two-Step System Estimator (GMM) is used to properly control for the endogeneity problems and individual heterogeneity of companies included in our sample (Blundell & Bond, 1998) . This methodology uses adjusted standard errors for potential heteroskedasticity as a superior estimation method (Blundell & Bond, 1998) in comparison with the Dynamic GMM and requires the proper choice of instrument for those variable that are presumably endogenous ( Alonso-Borrego & Arellano, 1999) . Therefore, the choice of instruments is a key decision in handling the endogeneity problem (Bond, 2002) .
According to Arellano (2003) , Hsiao (2007) and Baltagi (2013) , the advantages that panel data have over time series data or cross-section data refer to greater degrees of freedom, less multicollinearity, and more variation in the data, ultimately resulting in more-efficient estimators.
c. Variables measurement 9
For space saving reasons the F-GLS and the PCSE estimations are not reported, but they are available upon request to the corresponding author.
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In their well-cited paper, Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrated that Feasible Generalized Least Square specifications produce coefficient standard errors that are severely underestimated. Furthermore, by using Monte Carlo experiments, they report that PCSE estimator produces accurate standard error estimates at no or little loss in efficiency compared to F-GLS. However, in a more recent research, Reed and Webb (2010) claim that when the explanatory variables are characterized by substantial persistence -which is not necessarily for our case-, the PCSE estimator falls short in comparison to F-GLS. Hence, to minimize the bias in the parameters estimates because of the chosen methodology, the F-GLS and PCSE are simultaneously used as robustness checks of our major findings.
i. Dependent variable
The dependent variable corresponds to the earnings management. Given that this critical variable is not perfectly observable, we must use proxy variables, and in doing so we applied three alternative methods used in the empirical literature. All the accrual-based measures of earning management are based upon the magnitude of accruals which proxies the extent to which managers exercise discretion in reporting earnings (Dechow, 1994) .
We follow Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and Kyaw, Olugbode, and Petracci (2015) for our first measure of earning management 1 , calculated as the operating accruals as:
Where is the total accruals in model 1 calculated as ∆ ∆ ℎ ∆ ∆ ∆ for the firm in the period . Knowing that ∆ is the annual change in total current assets, ∆ ℎ is the change in cash and equivalent, ∆ is calculated as the change in total current liabilities, ∆ is the change in short-term debt included in current liabilities, ∆ is the change in income taxes payable and ∆ is the change in depreciation and amortization expenses. The numerator in equation (1) is scaled by which corresponds to the cash flows from operations to control for differences in firm size and performance.
Our second measure of earnings manipulation corresponds to a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals based on Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) . To get the discretionary accruals, the total accruals in model 2 are estimated as
Where all the inputs are the same as those already defined above.
Once the total accruals are calculated, they are split into their non-discretionary and discretionary components. Non-discretionary accruals are aimed to improve the informational content of financial statements. According to Jones (1991) 's model, total accruals are affected by the firm's usual business (which can affect non-cash current assets and liabilities) and by fixed assets (which can affect the depreciation expense). Consequently, are regressed depending on the change in sales ∆ and the gross level of property, plant, and equipment in the following equation, where variables are scaled by one-period lagged total assets :
Regarding the expected signs for and it might be said that this is not trivial, except for . In this case, it is expected that be negative because depreciation has been included with a negative sign in the definition of total accruals . However, there is not a clear prediction for the sign of because, on the one hand, higher level of sales might imply higher accounts receivable but, on the other hand, increases in sales usually imply increases in short-term debt too, so the net effect on the working capital might not be determined a priori.
Hence, the value of is the level of total accruals based on the firm's activity and the composition of the firm's assets. Therefore, the error term in that regression, which is the difference between observed and estimated accruals as stated in equation (2), would become the part of total accruals due to the discretionary behavior of managers 2 .
Given that the discretional behavior in earnings management might be used either to increase or reduce the earnings, we follow Gabrielsen, Gramlich, and Plenborg (2002) and calculate the absolute value of the second proxy of earnings management 2 to measure the extent of the discretionary behavior rather than of its direction.
The third measure used of earnings management 3 is also a cross-sectional model based on discretionary accruals according to Jones (1991) 's model. In this case, the total accruals are estimated as:
Where all the variables are those already described before and ∆ is the annual change in accounts receivable. Following Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) , while computing the nondiscretional accruals, we adjust the reported revenues on the sample of firms for the change in accounts receivable to capture any potential accounting discretion arising from sale credits.
Similar as before, the measure of discretionary accruals as our third proxy of earnings manipulation 3 is computed as the difference between total accruals and the fitted non-discretionary accruals defined corresponding to the residuals in (3).
ii. Independent variables
Gender diversity, the most important independent variable in this study, is estimated in different ways. Typically, we define it as the percentage of women on the board 1 which basically represents the share of female members on the total number of board members.
Nevertheless, given that a board composed only by male members or female members is characterized by lack of diversity, we follow Martín-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera (2014) 3 variable takes values between 0, when there is no gender diversification and 0.693 when there is an equal proportion of each gender category. This index assumes that 3 0 when 0. 2 and 3 variables are highly correlated as observed in Table 4 , but 3 is more sensitive to small changes in gender diversity that 2 due to its logarithmic transformation (Abad et al., 2017) -as observed when comparing their standard deviations shown in Table   3 -. Hence, we look at these measures as complementary measures of board gender diversity than substitute indicators, and due to that, both are used in our estimations.
In addition to these variables of gender diversity, we also considered a dummy covariate to measure the impact of quota systems across countries on earnings management to tests our second research hypothesis. Hence, takes value 1 if the country in a certain year had a required quota system as a minimum number of female board members and zero if no-quota is required.
As control variables we included similar information as in previous empirical papers. For instance, we entered the board size which is measured as the natural logarithmic transformation of the total number of board members. The number of independent board members as a share of the total number of board members is used to represent the extent to which the board decisions are not influenced by insiders' interest. Finally, time and country dummy variables were used to control for temporal and cross-country fixed effects.
Consequently, based on our hypotheses, we have formulated our multicounty-baseline empirical specification that takes the following form: 
Results
a. Univariate Analysis
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Visit https://www.heritage.org/index/about for further details about the construction and source of the Index of Economic Freedom. This section describes the general picture of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Besides the panel composition, Table 2 shows how the three alternative measures of earnings management are exhibited across countries. Portugal, Norway, Germany and Spain are the countries with the highest 1 variable. In the opposite place, with the lowest measure of earnings management 1 we find Sweden and Denmark. However, regarding EM2 and EM3, we observe that Portugal again is the country with the highest manipulation of financial statements.
We use Table 3 to show basic descriptive statistic of all the variables used in the analysis.
First, we test the hypothesis that the mean values of the three alternative measures of earnings management are equal to zero. As observed in Table 3 , we reject such null hypothesis at the The average number of board members is about 11.26 (exponent calculation of the measure of board size) with only 52.90% being independent members. The ownership structure shows that the majority shareholder holds almost an average of 19.00% of the outstanding shares. A typical company has an average of 65.50% of its total assets financed with debt with an average return of 4.80% on total assets.
Regarding the two contextual variables used in this study, we observe that the average economic freedom index is around 70 (exponent calculation of the variable), knowing that this variable goes from 0 to 100 with higher values as economic freedom increases. The second country-level variable used is a measure of government effectiveness which had an average of 1.50, ranging from -2.50 to 2.50 and with higher values showing better governance levels.
In Table 4 we observe that there are not substantially high correlations among the independent variables except for those that measure the same concept, such as the proxies for the discretionary earnings management, gender diversity, and growth opportunities.
b. Multivariate Analysis i. The Impact of Gender Diversity on Earnings Management
As mentioned above, several panel-data estimation methods are used to check the robustness of our findings. Tables 5 through 6 displays the results of the equation (4) In all these tables, the beneficial effect of the presence of women on the board of director 1 as a proxy of gender diversity on the earnings management practices of companies appears to be robust across all the specifications. In the same way, our results are consistent and statistically significant by using the three different proxies of earnings management
( 1, 2, and 3).
Specifically, Table 5 shows the results of the baseline model using the individual timeinvariant effect (FE), in addition to the temporal and country fixed effect. Time fixed-effect accounts for unobservable changes over time, and country fixed effects accounts for country unobserved differences in the sample. The nine alternative regressions are grouped based on the three alternative dependent variables ( 1, 2, and 3). These findings are aligned with our first hypothesis and supports the relevance of gender diversity on the board of directors as a mechanism to mitigate corporate earnings management practices. Barua et al. (2010) , Srinidhi et al. (2011), Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) , for US evidence, found that firms with more women on the board of directors show higher quality earnings. In the same way, Kyaw et al. (2015) , for European firms, show that their results highlight the importance of female empowerment. Table 5 reports the specifications with individual time-invariant effects (FE), which help us to tackle the unobservable heterogeneity problem. As observed at the bottom of the table,
Hausman test rejects the existence of random effects, and consequently, the individual fixedeffect hypothesis is accepted. All the specifications in Table 5 show a negative and statistically significant relationship of the parameter of 1 with earnings management practices. Estimates in specifications (1) to (3) with an average elasticity of -1.168, meaning that when women participation on the board changes 10%, the associated earnings management amount moves in the opposite direction by 11.7%. It is important to note that the elasticity changes substantially when we consider the other earnings management proxies (see columns [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] ). This negative relationship supports the idea that a higher presence of women on the board of directors constrains earnings management practices in the company.
In this respect, there are several arguments that support this negative relationship between the proportion of female board representative and the earnings management practices. For instance, regarding economics psychology arguments, it has been widely demonstrated that female executives are more risk averse than their male counterparties in their financial decisions (Cohn et al., 1975; Riley Jr. & Chow K., 1992) and more cautious and less aggressive in a variety of other decision contexts (Barua et al., 2010; J. Huang & Kisgen, 2013) . Concerning the gender of corporate decision makers and accounting conservatism, Francis et al. (2015) observe that, following the hiring of a female executive, there is a significant increase in the degree of accounting conservatism as compared to the degree of their male predecessor. Consequently, the arguments supported by conservatism, caution, less aggressiveness, and risk aversion of female directors strongly support our findings of a negative impact of the proportion of female board members and extent of earnings manipulation.
Additionally, there is another argument concerning the business ethics of female board members that justify our findings. According to Bernardi and Arnold (1997) female decision makers are at a significantly higher average level of moral development than their male counterparties which helps to improve the quality of reported earnings.
Besides, firm characteristics also affect earning management practices (Barua et al., 2010; Ye, Zhang, & Rezaee, 2010) . In Table 5 , it is observed that firm size and profitability have an effect over the dependent variable. In the first case, firm size has a mixed effect. On the one hand, when the proxy used for earnings management corresponds to the operating accruals 1 , we observe that it increases as the firm dimension increases too. However, on the other hand, when more accurate measures of earnings management are used -such as 2 and 3-which consider the discretionary component of the total accruals rather than just the gross total accruals, bigger firms constrain the managerial discretionary behavior. These findings disclose that the potential opportunistic conduct of managers is mitigated as the company grows. This is in line with the fact that bigger firms are more closely monitored and followed by analysts, reducing the room for potential managerial misbehavior (Hassan & Skinner, 2016) .
Regarding the firm's profitability , our results show a negative correlation between this variable and earnings management practices. Managers running more profitable companies have less incentives to overstate the firm performance, and consequently they engage less in manipulating the earnings in one or another direction.
Tables 6 provides robustness checks of our preliminary results by controlling for the potential skewedness usually observed in using FE specifications due the potential endogeneity problems and the minor problems of heteroskedasticity observed in estimations 1 and 3 in Table 5 through the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM).
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In Table 6 we specifically controlled for those covariates that a priori are considered as endogenous variables. In our case, and following previous empirical literature, 1 , , and are considered endogenous variables for which proper instruments are created based on their lagged values.
In Tables 6 we find This result is supported by the agency theory approach. As argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , high levels of debt reduce the firm's free cash-flow that otherwise might be used opportunistically by managers in suboptimal decisions such as private rent seeking, exerting a negative impact on discretionary accruals. Similarly, the arguments of the delegate monitoring (Berlin & Loeys, 1988 ) fit with our findings, suggesting that European indexed companies are tightly monitored by financial institutions through restricted debt covenants.
This idea is supported by the relevant role played by the financial institutions in civil-law countries, because the more intensive use of bank debt than public debt.
The corporate ownership concentration is another variable that deserves to be analyzed. variable is statistically significant in Table 6 for the estimates that consider the discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings management (e.g. 2 and 3 ).
Estimations 5, 6, 8 and 9 show that the managerial discretionary capacity is mitigated as the voting rights of the majority shareholder increase. The existence of concentrated ownership structures contribute to the solution of certain collective action conflicts, such as the freerider problem, by endowing the majority shareholders with proper incentives for managerial supervision that are not present in the case of minority shareholders (Bergström & Rydqvist, 1990 ). Our results support this reasoning, that majority shareholders reduce the earnings management practices as their voting rights increase. According to the Law and Finance approach, the ownership structure features are not independent from the financial system where companies operate, and these characteristics explain many aspects of the corporate decision-making process (La Porta, Lopez- De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, LopezDe-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997 . With the exception of the UK, all of the countries included in our sample belong to the civil-law legal system where the rights of the shareholders are not properly protected (La Porta et al., 1998) , which tends to drive greater ownership concentration as substitution mechanisms for weak legal protection of investors'
rights (López & Saona, 2005) . Consequently, our results support the fact that such relatively greater concentration of the ownership leads to better monitoring and lower misreporting of the financial information.
Contextual variables such as government effectiveness and the index of economic freedom provide some results, although not as robust as those found based on the firm characteristics. For instance, the worldwide governance indicator of government effectiveness is only significant in the sixth and ninth models of Tables 6. This finding suggests that as the governance indicators such as regulatory system and political stability improve at the national level, the manipulation of the financial statements decreases.
Likewise, when the index of economic freedom is used, we also find some weak evidence of this variable on earnings manipulation. In Table 5 for instance, the relationship is negative and statistically significant in model 2, suggesting that as the barrier to international trade, the regulation, and the enforcement of the law improves, there is less room for managers to misreport the financial information. Similar findings are observed in Tables 6, model 8. Differently from previous findings, Table 6 also provides additional information on the hypothesis of persistency in earnings management practices. As observed in the nine alternative models, none of them report significant coefficient for the one-period lagged dependent variable, and consequently, we reject the persistency of the earnings manipulation in the context of selected European corporations. The remaining results in Table 8 can be used as robustness checks for our previous findings.
Finally, in Table 7 we used our two alternatives and more suitable measures of gender diversity (see 2 and 3 variables). For space saving reasons, we recurred only to the results based on the GMM dynamic panel data, but all the other specifications (FE, F-GSL and PCSE) were also computed and their results remained consistent with those already shown in Table 7 . The findings in this table confirm the negative relation between gender diversity and EM practices, like observed in the previous tables. The main idea extracted from this table is that equilibrated diversity in the board have a deterrent effect over EM practices, benefiting earnings quality reported. In this case, and following Blau (1977) , Shannon (1948) , Abad et al. (2017) , Martín-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera (2014) and Baumgärtner (2006) , our gender measures are more than just women on board measures, these are rather diversity measures, making reference to equilibrated board in terms of women/men presence.
Related to the others independent variables, the results hold.
All the arguments presented in previous tables from multivariate analysis, confirm that more female presence at the board of directors will lead to less earnings manipulation, consistent with the hypothesis 1.
ii. The Impact of Female Quotas on Earnings Management
This part of the analysis is focused on assessing how the extent to which female quotas on the board of director stated by law or corporate governance codes across countries impact on the earnings management practices. Table 8 has been intended to consider the interacted relation between gender diversity and quotas and their joint impact on the earnings management practices. In regressions 3 through 6 for 2 and in regressions 9 to 12 for 3, the lineal combination between gender diversity measures and quotas requirements ( 2 2 * and 2 2 * ) show significant coefficients and with a greater economic impact than the standalone gender diversity measures ( 2 and 3, respectively). In this sense, the case of regressions 3 to 6, when gender diversity increases 10.00% and gender quota exists, the joined impact over earnings management practices decreases by 7.09%, computed as the mean among the significant coefficients computed as 2 2 * . Hence, this table shows evidence supporting the female quotas indications passed in the last decades in some countries in Europe as means to increase financial reporting transparency. We can state, therefore, that in countries where female quota indications (by law or recommendation)
exists, the impact of gender diversity has been more prominent in diminishing earnings manipulation practices than in countries where this kind of recommendations do not exist.
Therefore, the efforts in carrying out these measures in European countries have helped to constraint active earnings manipulation, consistent with the hypothesis 2.
Conclusions
Women are more prone to business ethics and risk aversion. Also, is considered that women have more moral values, motivation and achievement. Previous research has demonstrated the strategic and valuable role played by women in corporate positions. Studies have demonstrated that women on board influence positively the board effectiveness (Adams & Ferreira, 2009a; Chapple et al., 2018; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; PuchetaMartínez et al., 2016) , and the market perception of firm value (Gavious et al., 2012) . This paper studies how board gender diversity influences the managerial opportunistic behavior.
Specifically, we analyze the impact of board gender diversity as instrument of corporate governance in mitigating the earnings management practices in some selected European countries.
Our results confirm the benefits of having a balanced board in terms of gender diversity. In fact, the presence of female members mitigates earnings management practices. Moreover, the results show the relevance of legislations concerning the application of female quotas on boards in Europe.
Specifically, the results shed some light on two important aspects. First, the benefit of having a balanced board between men and women directors that tend to reduce or mitigate earning management practices. Second, the beneficial effect of equilibrated boards, exposed in this first point, is even more relevant in countries that have required female quotas on board of directors. The effort in carrying out this measure in European countries have led to less earnings manipulations and more informative financial statements.
Therefore, we conclude that it is necessary for the European governments, institutions, and policy makers to develop policies that promote legal frameworks in favor of quota systems with the corresponding sanctions. The enforcement of the law might eliminate the gender gap in decision making positions, which eventually will decrease managers' discretionary power. Measures need to be taken to promote equality between men and women on boards, contributing to reach one of the founding values of the European Union.
This work might be extended towards other countries besides Europe. Replicating this study in other world regions, it is possible to determine how the presence of women in corporate governance positions improve the firm's quality. In addition, these types of studies allows expressing the relevance of establishing regulations related to quota systems, a devise that our results confirm as a legislative success from the point of view of accounting manipulation. Also, we have focused our analysis on some selected listed European firms, (-4.7425 ) (-4 .3921) (-4 .3971) (-0.4898 ) (-0.3290 ) (-0.3278 ) (-0.3252 ) (-0.1577 ) (-0 
